




DDOS ATTACKS IN THE REAL WORLD

HOW TO MITIGATE THEM

Who Am I?


- Tobias Heister
- Solutions Architect
 - Technical Pre-Sales
 - Vendor MGMT for Focus Vendors
 - Solutions Engineering and Partner Evaluation
 - XT3LAB
- 3y Deutsche Telekom – Carrier and DC
- 8y Host Europe - Hosting Provider, Network centric Roles (Engineering, Managed Services)
- 4y Xantaro – Professional Services for 1y then SOLAR





- Our core competency is **SERVICE INTEGRATION** – the development and integration of solutions across technological and corporate boundaries.
- We plan, implement and maintain the networks and services of our customers, thereby supporting their business success.
- For our customers, we are their **TRUSTED ADVISOR** and the „**NO-WORRY-COMPANY**“, that inspires and creates an ultimate level of trust through absolute customer and service focus, ambitious execution, technical expertise and quality.
- 170 People (150 DE, 20 UK), >70% technical
- Experience Program for Engineers – 2 Years in various departments

OUR TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS – Covering All Network Layers




- DoS to DDoS
 - Ping of Death
- Volumetric Attacks
 - UDP based (no state on attacker side)
 - Reflection (Initiator does not attack directly)
 - Spoofed Sources
- Application Layer Attacks (Low and Slow)
 - Consume/Saturate Resources or Time Slots (Tar pitting, Slowloris)
 - State Exhaustion (Connection Tables, Memory, available Processes)
 - Scanning/Reconnaissance (find Vulnerability, weak passwords)
- Combinations
 - Volumetric Attack used as Smoke Screen
 - Targeted Application Layer Attack or Exploit/Hack





You can only fight what you see

- First Step is Detection (which has to be as automatic as possible)
- Multiple ways
 - Log Files, Flow Exporting, Customers Calling, Inline Solutions
- Volumetric Attacks have visible impact and Collateral Damage for the network
 - 250G coming into a 10G pipe will create Service Loss for everyone
 - Can take out entire network/infrastructure
- Application Attacks take out a specific service but may not be visible
 - Slowloris attack on single Webserver will not be noticeable on NOC Dashboard
 - Will likely hit single customers/service




Typical Detection Scenarios




- Most Systems available work on Thresholds
 - Defined per Segment/Customer/Network/Prefix per Protocol/Features/Behaviour Limit for \$timeframe
 - What is normal? Do the limits change over time?
- Some Systems provide Profiling
 - Learn for a period of time defined as normal, if specific threshold over normal -> alarm
 - (automatically) re run Profiling
 - How to make Sure that Profiling does not take place during attack? What if threshold level is triggered by valid event? (AD Campaign, \$event, ...)
- Fingerprints (Somebody knows it is bad so I can drop it without checking)
- Artificial Intelligence
- Escalation on Volume/Impact, if Threshold is X for Ymin and Impact is 100 times X reduce monitored timeframe
- We can only analyze what we see (Flow Exporting and Sampling vs. Inline)

Remove Threats


- Once Threats are detected we can do something
- Network centric
 - ACL/Firewall Filter
 - Remote Triggered Blackholing (if possible source based) -> IP Only
 - BGP Flow Spec -> IP/Proto/Port and a bit more
- Attack centric
 - Redirect/Off-Ramp Attack to Scrubbing Appliance
 - On-Ramp Cleaned Traffic
- External Help
 - Remote Triggered Blackholing send to Upstream/Carrier
 - BGP Flow Spec send to Upstream/Carrier
 - „Cloud based“ Mitigation (works only for $\geq /24$ or $/48$)




- Once detected and send to Mitigation Appliance we can analyze further (\geq Layer4)
- Common Countermeasures
 - Basic Compliance, valid IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, Checksums
 - Syn Authentication (OOS Ack, Redirect, Cookies)
 - Rate Limiting for BW, Connections (What is good? What is bad)
 - Regional Blocking (For a German Web shop DACH may be fine, the Rest of the World can stay away)
 - Protocol Compliance
 - Valid Verbs/Actions or Syntax
 - Reasonable Amount of Objects/queries
 - Strict/Loose RFC Handling
 - Timeouts
 - Proxy/CGNAT Handling (Client Identification)
 - SSL Handling, Handshake Compliance, Decrypt SSL?



- Common Countermeasures (continued)
 - Payload Analysis
 - ▶ Which DNS queries are valid (do we need to allow ANY queries?)
 - ▶ Regular Expression against Payloads (e.g. Fingerprints, Custom Expressions)
 - ▶ Bit/CodePoint of Death
 - Create enough Statefulness to identify threats
 - ▶ Reflection Attacks (lots of answers without any questions)
 - ▶ Slowloris
 - But keep Statefulness to a minimum to protect yourself
- ⇒ Most Countermeasures rely on Input for defining „normal“ Operation
- ⇒ Only activate meaningful Countermeasures




- Once identified as bad by Mitigation Appliance
 - If know bad source, block early
 - ▶ Blacklist on Mitigation Appliance hits before any expensive analysis is performed
 - ▶ Offload Blacklist to network ((s)RTBH, Flow Spec)
 - ▶ Share Knowledge (Fingerprints, Blacklists)
 - If only part of source is bad (e.g. 1/1000 Customers behind CGNAT)
 - ▶ Block Traffic but do NOT Blacklist
 - ▶ Identify Attacker and Share Knowledge
 - DDOS Sharing Initiative




Normal Operation

- Core Router communicate with Peakflow SP
 - Core => SP send netflow/IPFIX
 - Core <=> SP speak BGP/SNMP
- Traffic passes Core Router
- Traffic passes APS
- Traffic reaches Customer Router




Volume Attack

- Peakflow SP detects Attack and raises Alarm
- Peakflow SP starts mitigation
 - Attack Traffic will be redirected to Peakflow TMS
 - PeakFlow TMS mitigates Attack
 - Peakflow TMS sends clean Traffic Back to Core
- Traffic passes APS
- Traffic reaches Customer Router




Small Attack

- Small Attack
 - low bandwidth (below 1G in this example)
 - Application based, thus not detectable via netflow
- Attack traffic passes Core router
- No alarm raised on Peakflow SP
 - Not detectable via netflow
- APS detects attack
- Attack traffic reaches APS
- APS mitigates attack traffic
- APS send clean traffic to customer



Larger Attack

- larger Attack
 - high bandwidth (above 1G in this example)
 - Application based, thus not detectable via netflow
- APS detects attack
 - local mitigation impossible due to bandwidth
- APS contacts Peakflow SP
 - uses cloud signalling
 - informs about attack type and size
- Peakflow SP starts mitigation
 - Attack Traffic will be redirected to Peakflow TMS
 - PeakFlow TMS mitigates Attack
 - Peakflow TMS sends clean Traffic to APS
- Clean Traffic passes APS



Market Players – Xantaro Partner Portfolio

Inline Detection/Mitigation



Out of Band Detection



Off-Ramp Mitigation

Cloud Based Mitigation

Designing a Solution

- Integration of existing End to End Vendor Solution
 - Integrate into existing Network
 - Understand Traffic Flows
 - Deploy Solution
 - Support and Vendor Communication

- Create Xantaro Product
 - All of the above
 - Product Tailor made for Customer
 - Bring together vendors to form a solution

